

DANA DESA AND SOCIAL CAPITAL (CASE STUDIES IN DESA SUMBER JAYA, PESAWARAN, LAMPUNG, INDONESIA)

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Abstrak

This research aims to find the impact of village fund (dana desa) programs on social capital and political participation in the Village or rural area in Indonesia. This is a case study research, located in Sumber Jaya Village (Desa Sumber Jaya), Pesawaran Regency, Lampung Province. We also used a quantitative well-informed person assessment research method, a method that assesses the issue of research by asking the stakeholders who have good information about the research topic. There were 33 research respondents who were subsequently asked through questionnaires. The results show that there is still a high tradition of gotong royong, and guyub culture in Sumber Jaya Village, however, when we asked them whether the influence of village funds on social capital and political participation, generally respondents think that there was an influence as seen by the trend of declining scores when we asked by combining the variable of village funds, together with social capital and political participation. Regarding this result, our policy recommendation for future village fund policy based on the game theory model is that government should spend more on social safety net programs or universal basic income in the form of private goods rather than infrastructure spending in the form of public goods.

Keywords: Village Funds, Social Capital, Trust, Political Participation, Game Theory Model

I. INTRODUCTION

One of the key factors in democracy, including at the village level, is the level of trust in the village government officials and the trust between fellow villagers. The theory of social capital, where trust is one of the elements in it, becomes an important element in the political participation of rural communities. A study by Robert Putnam (1999) in Italy in his book "How Democracy Work" found the fact that areas with better trust and social capital would have a positive impact on the level of political participation of society. Furthermore, it is the political participation of this community that then makes the government able to carry out its development function well. On the other hand, in areas with low trust, political participation is low and has some negative impacts on government output such as

development failure and poor government service.

Why a citizen chooses to participate in political and government activities has long been a concern of political scholars. One of the classic works that is much cited is the work of Almond and Verba (1965). These two political scholars divided the political culture in relation to political participation into three categories after conducting a comparative study of politics in five countries, such as the United States, Britain, Mexico, Germany, and Italy. The first category is called parochial a political culture, which is political culture when people participate in political activities are very low, and their attention to the political world is almost non-existent. Almond and Verba exemplify the political culture of the African interior to illustrate the parochial political culture. The second category is termed with the political culture of the subject. The political culture of subject

is the society with economically advanced but still passive in politics. They still understand politics and the political system but are uninterested in political activities and refuse to participate. The third category, the ideal category is defined as the political culture of "participants" or civic culture. In this category, the community is already economically and socially good, and they actively participate in political activities. They also have a critical awareness of changing public policy. The main weakness of these categories given by Almond and Verba above is that it does not make political self-interest and cultural factors and critical citizens as significant factors that contribute in evaluating political cultural variables. In fact, we can find many people are fully politically aware but do not believe in political system. They generally do not have an individual political interest, they also have awareness about political issues, but they think the candidates and the policy cannot change the social condition.

We see that the Robert Putnam's (2003) theory is appropriate when we analyze political culture and participation in political activities associated with trust. In his study of Italy, Putnam found two different regions in Italy in terms of political culture. People in Northern Italy have a better civic political culture than the southern regions. Putnam then argues that social capital and trust is a determining factor of the difference between the two regions. Trust then made social capital such as the emergence of voluntary organizations, participate in elections, high level of political literacy and mutual trust among fellow members of society and politicians became the main factor in the success of a government. It can be concluded that the political movement of the people to actively participate concerning the running the government, including the election process and public policy making related to the trust issue. Putnam's idea of social capital became an important theoretical explanation in seeing the success of a government.

Putnam's idea was also continued by several social scientists in various countries including Indonesia. The idea of social capital and trust issue is actually not much different from the teachings of gotong royong and

guyub in the noble culture of the Indonesian nation for a long time. Sujarwoto and Tampubolon (2013) research underlines that gotong royong is an important social capital in the success of maternal and child health programs in Indonesia. Social capital is defined by them in the form of a culture of participation in health communities. However, there is still a lack of research in the topic of trust in the context of village fund policy. This paper will cover this gap.

We argue that village funds and money politics causes the lack of trust that creates political conflicts at the village level, especially during the village election. Distrust among elites, and between elites and mass because the way of the central government policy of giving a large amount of money village to village fund (dana desa). This policy ignores the improvement of inclusive institutions, which in fact must be built first as the foundation of dana desa. As a result, village funds become a source of distrust among the population that destroys the culture of guyub (kinship) and gotong royong which has been a kind of social capital in the village since a long time ago. The competition for getting this economic resource among the village elites then only places the village community as a passive object during the Pilkades (village election), and they will be forgotten in the budget policy making process after the pilkades. Our hypothesis is that the cause of low political participation of the people in the village is due to the erosion of social capital in the village such as trust, the culture of volunteerism, and so on. The lack of social capital is then influenced by policy implementation errors in the village fund policy. Being curious with this hypothesis then encouraged us to conduct this research.

II. RESEARCH METHODS

All stakeholders in the village are participants in this study. The sample in this study was conducted according to the purposive sampling directions, the sample was taken based on certain criteria and objectives. The focus of this study is to conduct a quantitative assessment of some challenges in the issue of social capital and public participation by taking a case study in

Desa Sumber Jaya Pesawaran. Primary data taken from the results of quantitative well-informed assessment conducted by the 33 respondents from selected stakeholders both elements of village government, civil society including village figures, religious figures and youth and private. Quantitative well-informed person assessment is a method to assess the object of research conducted by stakeholders who have well information about the topic of this research. In this context, this study selected respondents / informants who are asked to make a quantitative assessment of the way the government works in the village in terms of social capital, village funds, collaboration and participation. In addition, the respondents or informants have provided an assessment of some challenges in their area in the issue of increasing social capital, political participation and collaboration. The selection of informants is conducted based on the track record and socio-political activities of the informants.

The score in this case is an ordinal scale from 5 to 1. The score for the best rank is 5 and the worst is 1. The score is 4 for relatively good. Score 3 is nor good or bad, 2 for bad and 1 for the worst. In some questionnaires we deliberately reverse the order of scores to detect inconsistent respondents due to their original answers.

III. RESULTS AND FINDINGS


The first treatment we do the respondent is asking them about social capital condition without asking them its relationship to dana desa (village fund). Surprisingly, we find most of the respondents think that their condition of social capital is fine. However, when we asking them with including the dana desa variable (treatment), there is the trend of decreasing of social capital conditions.

Guyub Condition

How guyub (kinship) is the condition of your village today? That is our first question to the respondents. The data shows that from 33 respondents on average, they rated the condition of their village on a scale of 4 (good). There were 22 respondents (66.6 percent) who rated the village as friendly. On

average from a scale of 1-5, the condition of guyub in Sumber Jaya Village is: 3.9. Table 1 beshows this assessment of 33 respondents when we ask the condition of their guyub

Table. 1: Guyub Condition
(X axis is the order number of respondents; Y Axis is assessment; average value is 3.9)




The data above provides the fact that in general, elites that we consider as elite who know the condition of their village, generally argue that their village is relatively friendly. However, different data can be seen if we compare it to the conditions in cities where urban people generally do not feel that they have guyub culture.

Gotong Royong Spirit

The second question that we ask in order to identify social capital is the question of the spirit of mutual cooperation or gotong royong. We asked how strong the spirit of gotong royong (gotong royong) is towards the 33 respondents (table 2). Thus, we find that the average score of mutual cooperation from a scale of 1-5 is 3.9, a figure that is exactly the same as the spirit of community in Sumber Jaya Village.


Table 2. Gotong Royong Spirit (X axis is the order number of respondents; Y Axis is assessment; average value is 3.9)



Level of Trust

The average score also was 3.9 when we asked the third question of the social capital variable, trust. When we asked how much confidence did respondents think that the village government is working very hard for the welfare of the people? The average respondents' score is 3.9 (table 3). A figure that shows that village communities have high level of trust in village officials. The following is a table regarding the level of trust between the community and government officials in Sumber Jaya Village with the highest score range for very trust is 5 while very much on disbelief is 1.

Table 3: level of trust
Level of Trust




Correlation between Village Funds and Trust

Our initial hypothesis is that village funds cause low social capital, especially trust. To answer that, we asked the respondents for their assessment of whether the village fund program generated many negative suspicions among residents? We found that there was a significant decrease in the trend of respondents' average answers. The score also changed to 3.06 when respondents were asked to analyze the effect of village funds on trust among residents. The following table (table 4) is a chart for this

question and the answers from 33 respondents.

Table 4: Dana Desa and Trust among citizens




The average trend of answers also declined when the question entered a sensitive matter, citizen trust on village government officials. On average, respondents answered that they had suspicion, although it was close to the same as when village funds were not available. The mean score for this question was 2.9, which was a significant decrease from the questions about guyub and gotong royong. Table 5 is the data when the researchers ask the community about trust in the village government.

Table 5: Dana Desa and Trust of Citizens to Village Government



From the data above, it can be concluded that there is a downward trend in scores when we researchers add some questions about the relationship between village funds and social capital (table 5). However, when the question only asks for a single variable of social capital, such as gotong royong, guyub and trust, the assessment of 33 respondents is relatively better. We can conclude that there is a negative correlation between village funds and social capital, that is, village funds have an effect on discouraging social capital, especially about trust to the village officials/government.


Table 7: Musrembang in the last 10 years



The relative stagnant of citizen participation in the last 10 years indicates that village funds have not automatically increased community participation. Previous studies from Ben Olken (2007) indicated that aid funds in Indonesia did not make citizens more actively participate when it came to public goods such as infrastructure. However, according to Olken, citizen supervision as a form of public participation will be stronger if it is related to private goods such as BLT (cash transfer) and Bansos (social aids) in the form of basic food items. This is the reason why village fund projects that are spent in the public goods sector such as infrastructure do not increase citizen participation.

We then continue the question of how citizen critical awareness to the government. It is whether critical or not. The critique of citizens is one of the spirits of participatory democracy. Our question is, do they think that since the village fund was created, the village community has become more aware and critical. The average score for the question on the relationship between village funds and community critical attitudes is only 2.9 on a scale of 1-5 (table 8). It means that it is still on a scale of 2, it means they do not have critical awareness to the public issues.


Table 8: Critical Awareness to the government



In general, we conclude that for the participation variable there is a phenomenon of decline when we ask about the form of

Participation

We define participation in desa (village) context as the citizen engagement in policy making process in the village. In Indonesia we call it Musrembang (Musyawrah Rencana Pembangunan), a public hearing or deliberative forum in Desa in development planning. Then, we ask 33 respondents about community involvement in the Musrembang Desa. We ask how actively residents are involved in musrembang, then the average score is 3.3, when 3 is means just ordinary. Majority of respondent (73.2 percent) fell that the citizen engagement neither is active nor passive. It could be a strong indication that participatory and deliberative democracy within the framework of public policymaking in the village is a serious problem.

Table 6: Citizen Engagement
Citizen Engagement in Musrembang


Our next question is to ask respondents to evaluate citizen participation in Musrembang in the last 10 years where village funds have become a government program since the Joko Widodo administration. Our question is that compared to the previous era, do you think that in the last 10 years there has been a decrease in village community participation in village government activities such as musrembang (table 7)? The average score of respondents' answers was 3.3 or 60.6 percent of respondents considered that the participation of ordinary citizens had not changed. There are 36.3 percent feel better. And 3.01 percent said there was a decrease. The following is a chart of the responses of 33 respondents to this question.

formal policy making that has been regulated by law, namely the Musrembang mechanism. However, residents are relatively active in social activities such as mutual cooperation or community service and community organizations such as PKK, which are not directly related to policy making in the village. When the participation variable is related to the village fund variable, we get a phenomenon that the citizen's participation in musrembang and the critical attitude of residents tends to be weak. This phenomenon can be concluded that village funds do not actually increase citizen awareness of the process of making public policies in the village.

Discussion

Many political scientists then examine why critical attitudes do not arise in society. One satisfactory explanation in our opinion is the rational choice theory approach. Rational choice theory assumes that human attitudes are highly dependent on the incentives and disincentives received by humans or actors. In the study of natural resource curse, for example, experts assume that the critical attitude of society depends on whether or not there are incentives missing from their private good. For example, Scandinavian countries have a level of transparency and critical public participation because the state imposes high taxes on its citizens. As a result of taking private goods from citizens in the tax system, then citizens are more critical in monitoring where the money is spent and supervising government processes that use the tax money collected from them. This phenomenon is also a logical explanation when explaining why a country that relies on natural resources and weak tax regime (because it relies on rich natural resources) makes its citizens uncritical. Citizens are not critical because they feel that none of their money is collected by the government in the name of taxes. The government itself has had enough by depending on income from the sale of natural products such as oil, for example. Ross's (2013) study in his book the oil curse has become a famous study in explaining the phenomenon of undemocratic Middle Eastern countries due to the phenomenon of being rich in oil and minimal taxes.

The case study in Sumber Jaya Village provides the same framework as the oil curse theory as described above. There is no critical attitude of residents in monitoring village funds because villagers do not feel any incentives are missing from the existence of village funds. However, as explained earlier by Ben Olken that when the village fund or social assistance is a direct subsidy in the form of cash transfers and includes basic food assistance, the monitoring and critical attitude of the residents increases, but if it is in the form of infrastructure (public good) then supervision and participation will be minimal.


Modeling Dana Desa; Game Theory Approach

There are some interesting data our research, so we can make an assumption which can be modeled in a game theory model. Our first assumption is that village funds do not contribute much to society because they are spent more on infrastructure.

The second assumption is that spending on infrastructure means spending on public goods, which according to Ben Olken's (2007) experimental research from MIT makes citizens less concerned about transparency. Our data has addressed this aspect when we ask the respondent about transparency of dana desa. There were at least 10 respondents who were village officials who would have been biased to judge themselves and 23 others were non-village officials. The result is that the average answer "does not know" with a score of 3.4. This shows that so far village funds tend to be not transparent with our assumption that the respondent's "don't know" is that they don't care or do not want to conflict as the culture of the village community. If divided into 2 clusters, village officials and non-village officials, two perspectives are found. Of the 10 village officials, 60 percent answered that they were transparent, 30 percent answered they did not know and only 10 percent (1 person), answered that they were very transparent. For the non-village apparatus cluster, 39.1 percent stated that they were transparent, and 21.7 percent said they did not know. There were 17, 3 percent answered that they

were not transparent, and conversely there were 8 percent who answered that they were very transparent. Unfortunately, there was 1 participant, namely the 10th respondent who abstained, did not answer. Table 9 is a table of all respondents:

Table 9: Transparency of Dana Desa




The third assumption for the village apparatus elite that infrastructure spending is more profitable for 2 reasons; first, it will be easy for rent seeking activities between village officials and contractors, and secondly, there will be less maintenance from residents. The fourth assumption is that politically, village funds with infrastructure spending will easily show the "progress" of their development, and this is beneficial for a village head to advance in village head elections as a routine election agenda.

In general, game theory analysis will answer two key questions; In the first part, the question is why are more village funds being spent in the form of infrastructure development? Meanwhile, what if the second part of the village is changed to the form of cash transfer cash transfers or BLT and universal basic income?

Infrastructure Game

The first scenario we compiled is the game theory model of village funds from a village head or village government elite when they receive village funds from the government, and they are given autonomy to carry out budget allocation policies. The following picture we call as a "game of infrastructure" in order to explain why village heads and their officials tend to be closed off and the community tends to apathetic if more village funds are spent on infrastructure. Our model

below also explains the first game theory scenario where the blue stripe is the dominant strategy that will be used by the player (village head) and the community.



Picture 1: Game of Infrastructure, the blue color represents the dominant strategy of both village officials and the community. C = cost which in this case must be <0 or minus, K = corruption.


The game infrastructure is started by two players, the village apparatus and the citizen or community. The main objective of village officials is to get economic benefits from infrastructure projects through project "fees", either for personal enrichment purposes or for election campaign funding for to the next head village election. A village head can choose 2 strategies; to choose open (transparent) or closed.

The dominant strategy with the most benefit (payoff) for the village head is closed. When a village is closed, the community will respond with two scenarios, the critical thinking of community asking for an open government, or the second respond is apathies. Society will have a better chance of remaining apathetic or ignorant than critical. When the community is critical, the community will pay a fee $(-C)$, we call it the cost resulting from the costs of organizing meetings, mobilization, to transportation and consumption costs, etc. Whereas the benefits of infrastructure if then the struggle cannot be utilized directly, so we assume it as zero benefit (0) . The advantage of zero (0) is also obtained by village apparatus because with transparency the village apparatus does not receive project fees and village funds are fully

suspended on infrastructure due to the critical supervision of the village community. As a result, the cost that will be loss if the society criticize the project is $-C$. Thus, the community tends to remain apathetic because they do not want to lose incentives financing social movements in demanding the openness of village funds. As a result, the scenario that will occur is that the community is apathetic, and the village head will be closed and then have the opportunity to make a profit through corruption (K). In this scenario the community has nothing to lose but the village head will benefit from the existing project fee ($K = \text{Corruption}$). This is the reason why village heads prefer to spend on infrastructure projects.

Private Goods and Village Fund Model

However, how about if the village fund model is changed from public goods to private goods? The following scenario is a game of village funds to explain why village heads and officials tend to be open, and the community is more critical if more village funds are spent in the kind of private goods such as social assistance (bansos) and BLT (cash transfer). The image below explains the second game theory scenario where the bold line will be the dominant strategy that will be used by the player (village head) and the community/citizen.



Picture 2: Game Theory model of Private good and village fund: $K = \text{corruption}$, $C = \text{Cost}$, $B = \text{Benefit from village fund}$.

In this second scenario the community/citizen will be more critical when village funds are in the form of direct incentives such as cash transfers (either in

the form of target groups or subsidies equally such as universal basic income) and basic food stamp. As a result, regarding the concern that funds can be corrupted (disincentive), the community's best behaviour or scenario is to involve and to oversee the policy process. On the other hand, the most beneficial strategy for the village apparatus is to remain closed with the hope that the community will remain apathetic ($K > 0$). However, this strategy can make the village citizen loss of benefits ($-B$). Thus, this is the worst scenario for the community with cash or their food subsidy will be cut illegally by the village officials for their personal benefit. As result, in this scenario the citizen will not remain silent, they will be critical. Despite the originally scenario of village apparatus will be closed to the governance process, but the critical respond by the community make this scenario cannot will be happened, the village apparatus will lose ($-K$) and the village community will also lose ($-C$), nevertheless, the citizens get the advantage of their political struggle (B). This scenario will not work well if $B < C$ because it will get a minus score. Therefore, the scenario that will occur is that the government has no other option but to be transparent because their hopes that ignorant society is not possible. Whereas for the community, there is no other choice but to be critical, because if they are not critical or apathetic (ignorance society) then there will lose their benefit (B).

The second scenario above, if we combine in the prisoner dilemma, is as follows:

		Citizens	
Village Apparatus	Ignorant	0, +B	0, +B
	Critical	+K, -B	-K, B-C
	Transparent		
Closed			

Picture 3: Prisoner Dillema of Dana Desa, Nash Equilibrium from this scenario will be the critical citizens and the transparency of village government (0,+B red colour).

In conclusion, from our game theory model we can conclude that the effective model of aid funds for the village fund program is private goods model. This scenario makes the community more likely to be critical and pressure village officials to be more transparent and participative. Compared to the current conditions, village funds are prone to corruption, this is due to the low level of critical power as the implication of the lack supervision activities from the community or village citizens. It will be a good challenge for the next researcher to prove our model in experimental research.

IV. CONCLUSION

There is a cause and effect relationship between village funds and the and social capital in Sumber Jaya village. The downward trend in scores occurred when we treat the respondent with asking them the relationship between village funds, social capital and participation. People also tend to be apathetic (do not know how to respond) to the deliberative forum such as village policy-making processes, in this case Musrembang. In general, the condition of the village is still guyub and social capital was relatively high when we asked them to assess the condition of the village without involving the village fund variable.

From the game theory scenario model, it can be concluded that the appropriate aid model for the village fund program is a private goods aid model. This makes the community more likely to be critical and to forces the village government to be more transparent. So far, village funds are prone to being corrupted because they are in the form of public goods. It is the impact of the lack of critical power and the lack supervision from the community. In the future, the game theory model scenarios above will be a challenge for further research to prove it in experimental research.

However, this research has several limitations, including funding and time due to Covid 19. The main weakness is the limitations of the research method. It would be better if the game theory model that come

from our initial survey data is continued with experimental research. To see more complex variables, ethnographic research is highly recommended to look at deeper problems related to the impact of village funds on social capital.

For policy makers, our recommendation for future village fund policy models in order to encourage political participation is that to recommends government to allocate village funds to be spent more on social safety net programs or universal basic income (private goods) rather than infrastructure spending (public goods). This will be more effective in preventing corruption and at the same time increasing the welfare and poverty eradication directly in the village.

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